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We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to 
lotteries and may depend on factors other than agents’ preferences. We assume that agents 
are not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in a lexicographical way. We 
define iterative honesty-proofness by iteratively removing messages dominated by more 
honest messages. We show that in the complete information environments with small fines, 
every social choice function is implementable in iterative honesty-proofness. This is in 
contrast with the standard implementation model, because any ‘normative’ social choice 
function depending on non-preference factors is never implementable when agents are not 
influenced by factors other than pure self-interest. We extend this result to the incomplete 
information environments with quasi-linearity and with correlated private signals. 
Next, we assume that it is costly for each agent to report dishonestly and this cost may 
be close to zero. We show that in the incomplete information environments, every incentive 
compatible social choice function can be implemented by the mechanism that is universal 
in the sense that it does not depend on the private signal structure. 
 
Keywords: Honesty-Orientation, Normative Social Choice Functions, Implementation, 
Small Fines, Universal Mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to 
lotteries over the set of pure alternatives and may depend on factors other than agents’ 
preferences. We will take into account the fact that real human behavior may be influenced 
by factors other than pure self-interest such as honesty-orientation.
1 The purpose of this 
paper is to show that, by allowing agents to be honesty-oriented only in marginal ways, we 
can drastically expand the class of implementable social choice functions. We also discuss 
the possibility of implementing a social choice function by using a mechanism that does not 
depend on the detail of the model structure. 
First, we investigate the complete information environments where there exist three 
agents who know what is the true state. We assume that there exists a single agent who is 
not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in a lexicographical way. That is, 
this agent prefers a message to another message if the former is more honest than the latter 
and both messages provide her with the same expected utility. We define the solution 
concept named iterative honesty-proofness by iteratively removing messages that are 
dominated by its more honest messages. We require a mechanism to have the unique 
iteratively honesty-proof message profile at every state. We allow the central planner to 
fine agents only small amounts of the private goods. 
We show that every social choice function is implementable in iterative honesty-
proofness. This is in sharp contrast with the standard model of implementation where all 
agents are never influenced by factors other than pure self-interest.
2  A social choice 
function is said to be normative if there exist distinct states that provide agents with the 
same preference profile, but to that it assigns different lotteries. We must note that, in the 
standard model, it is impossible for any normative social choice function to be 
implementable.
3 For instance, we require a mechanism to have the unique Nash equilibrium 
outcome at every state, and require this outcome to be equivalent to the lottery assigned by 
the social choice function to this state. Whenever a pair of distinct states induces the same 
preference profile, then the agents are faced with the same game between these states. 
Hence, the resultant sets of Nash equilibria must be equivalent between these states. This, 
however, is a contradiction because there exists such a pair of states to that the normative 
social choice function assigns different lotteries.
4 
                                                 
1 There exist works on psychological games such as Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) and 
Rabin (1993) in which players are not purely self-interested. For surveys on psychology and economics, 
see Rabin (1998) and Fehr and Schmidt (2001). 
2 There exist recent works in the implementation literature such as Eliaz (2001) that take into account 
factors other than pure self-interest such as bounded rationality. These works checked the robustness of 
implementability in terms of ideally rational equilibrium concepts. 
3 For the survey of implementation in the complete information environments, see Moore (1992). Most 
authors defined a state as the preference profile of agents, which automatically excludes the class of all 
normative social choice functions. 
4 There exist many works in implementation with complete information that showed their respective 
possibility theorems by weakening the requirement of Nash implementability. For instance, Moore and   3 
A state as the input of a social choice function may involve information about factors 
that are not relevant to agents’ preferences. Whenever a social choice function depends on 
such factors, then it is normative. Social choice functions that make use of interpersonal 
utility comparison such as the utilitarian social choice function (D’Aspremont and Gevers 
(1977)) and the leximin social choice function (Deschamps and Gevers (1978)) are all 
normative. Economic judgments in real situations are sometimes based on non-utility 
factors such as poverty, inequality, and rights. Several philosophers and ethical economists 
emphasized that such non-utility factors do play the crucial role in ethical judgments and 
introduced their respective notions of anti-welfarism such as primary goods (Rawls (1971)) 
and capabilities (Sen (1985)).
5 
Even from more positivist-like viewpoints, normative social choice functions are very 
important to investigate. Suppose that there exist disadvantageous individuals who cannot 
participate in the decision procedure but are deeply influenced by the decision. Then, the 
impact of these individuals’ preferences on the ethical judgment should be crucial. Hence, 
the social choice function must depend on these individuals’ preferences. The participants’ 
preferences, however, do not well represent their preferences. In this case, the social choice 
function must be normative in our sense. Moreover, Serrano and Vohra (1998) presented an 
example (Example I in their paper) in the economic environments with incomplete 
information, in which all agents’ preferences are the same across states but their initial 
endowments depend on the state. In their example, any individually rational social choice 
function is inconstant. Hence, every individually rational social choice function must be 
normative. 
From the observations above, it is clear that a social choice function may be normative 
when the set of states as its domain is inclusive and it reflects the equity (or individual 
rationality) in a society. In spite of its apparent importance, however, it is a widely held 
view in implementation theory that no normative social choice function can be 
implemented through decentralized decision making in the complete information 
environments. In contrast, the result of this paper implies that we can make every normative 
social choice function implementable merely by introducing the honesty-oriented motive of 
a single agent that is weak enough to be consistent with this agent’s purely self-interested 
motive. 
Next, we investigate the incomplete information environments where agents have their 
private signals regarding what is the true state. We assume that there exist three or more 
agents, and all agents are not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Repullo (1988) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) replaced Nash equilibrium with weaker solution 
concepts such as subgame perfect equilibrium and undominated Nash equilibrium. These works did not 
take the class of normative social choice functions into account. In fact, no normative social choice 
function is implementable even if we replace Nash equilibrium with any such purely self-interested 
solution concept. 
5  Classical social choice theory assumed that a social welfare functional depends only on agents’ 
preference profile, and therefore, did not investigate normative social choice in our sense. Sen criticized 
classical social choice theory for allowing only such extremely narrow informational bases. See Sen 
(1982, 1999).   4 
lexicographical way. We define the solution concept named Bayesian iterative honesty-
proofness, require a mechanism to have the unique Bayesian iteratively honesty-proof 
message profile at every state, and allow the central planner to fine agents only small 
amounts. We assume that utilities are quasi-linear. We also assume that agents’ private 
signals are correlated. 
We show that every incentive compatible social choice function is implementable in 
Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness. This i s  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  B a y e s i a n  N a s h  
implementation as follows. Suppose that all agents have complete knowledge about their 
preference profile. Then, it is impossible for any normative social choice function to be 
implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Serrano and Vohra (2001), for instance, 
showed in their example that with complete knowledge, any individually rational social 
choice function is not implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, even if it is incentive 
compatible. In contrast, every normative and incentive compatible social choice function is 
implementable in Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness, even if agents have complete 
knowledge about their preferences.
6 
Finally, we reconsider the incomplete information environments where there may exist 
only two agents. We assume that it is costly for each agent to report dishonestly for 
psychological reasons. Hence, all agents are not purely self-interested. Based on this, we 
introduce a modified version of Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness. 
Several past works such as Erard and Feinstein (1994), Alger and Ma (1998), and 
Deneckere and Severinov (2001) examined the case that agents’ ability to manipulate 
information is limited, and demonstrated that including honesty-oriented agents could 
significantly alter the model. These works commonly assumed that the cost of reporting 
dishonestly is so large that we may not need to impose the standard incentive compatibility 
constraints on an implementable allocation.
7 In contrast, this paper allows the maximal total 
cost of reporting dishonestly to be as close to zero as possible, and focuses on the 
uniqueness constraints instead of the incentive compatibility constraints. Hence, we can say 
that every agent is, not exactly, but virtually, purely self-interested. 
We show that every incentive compatible social choice function is implementable. This 
result is very permissive as follows.  We do not require any restriction on the private signal 
structure such as whether agents’ private signals to be correlated or independent. Of 
particular importance, the constructed mechanism is universal in the sense that it does not 
depend on the private signal structure. Hence, the central planner can construct the 
mechanism without any knowledge about the private signal structure. Moreover, whenever 
                                                 
6  For the survey of implementation in the incomplete information environments, see Palfrey (1992). 
When agents do not have complete knowledge about their preferences, there may exist normative social 
choice functions that are implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For characterization and 
permissive results, see Jackson (1992), Matsushima (1993), Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), Duggan 
(1997), and Serrano and Vohra (2000). 
7 Deneckere and Severinov (2001) assumed that the cost of reporting a single dishonest message is small. 
They constructed mechanisms in which each agent can make multiple announcements. Here, the total 
cost of reporting multiple dishonest messages may be large enough to make the standard incentive 
compatibility constraints needless.   5 
truth telling is an ex post equilibrium in the revelation game, then even agents do not need 
to know the private signal structure. These points are in sharp contrast with the previous 
works in Bayesian implementation where a mechanism was tailored to a specific situation, 
and therefore, it would be difficult to use in practice.
8 
In most part of this paper, we construct mechanisms where each agent makes multiple 
announcements. The paper is related to Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b, 1994) in this 
respect. In contrast to Abreu and Matsushima, however, the paper does not use the device 
of virtualness originated in Matsushima (1988, 1993) and Abreu and Sen (1991). Hence, 
our possibility theorems are on ‘exact’ implementation as opposed to ‘virtual’, and our 
mechanisms might be much simpler than the mechanisms in Abreu and Matsushima for this 
reason.
9 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the basic model and 
introduces normative social choice functions. Section 3 introduces honesty-orientation in 
the lexicographical sense, and shows that in the complete information environments, every 
social choice function is implementable in iterative honesty-proofness with small fines. 
Section 4 constructs so-called modulo mechanisms, and shows that even without fines, 
many normative social choice functions are implementable when we replace iterative 
honesty-proofness with a weaker concept named honesty-proof Nash equilibrium. We also 
argue on a complementary role of salience-orientation. Section 5 shows that in the 
incomplete information environments, every incentive compatible social choice function is 
implementable in Bayesian honesty-proofness when agents’ private signals are correlated. 
Section 6 assumes that it is costly for every agent to report dishonestly, and shows that even 
if this cost is close to zero, every incentive compatible social choice function can be 
implemented by the universal mechanism. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                 
8 A relevant point can be found in auction theory where from a practical standpoint a mechanism is 
sometimes restricted not to depend on the fine detail of the private signal structure. In the auction theory 
context, the terminology of ‘universal’ may have more restrictive implications than in this paper. For 
instance, we may require an auction-like mechanism not to depend on the social choice function. See 
Krishna (2002). 
9 Abreu and Matsushima (1994) studied exact implementation but used a similar idea of virtualness to 
Abreu and Matsushima (1992a).   6 
2. The Model 
 
Let   denote the finite set of agents whom the planner requires to announce 
messages.
} ,..., 1 { n N =
Ω
10 Let   and    denote the nonempty and compact sets of states and pure 
alternatives, respectively. The utility function for each agent   is given by 
A
N i∈
R R A ui → Ω × × :.  
The central planner will choose a pure alternative and fine each agent a nonnegative 
amount of the private goods that is less than or equals 
0 ≥ +ξ ε , 
where ε  and ξ  are nonnegative real numbers. When the central planner chooses a  and 
fines each agent i  the amount   at the state ω , the resultant utility 
for agent i is given by u . We assume that u  is increasing with respect to 
 for every  . 
A ∈
N ∈
∈ ) ,ω A
] , 0 [ ξ ε+ ∈ − i t
Ω × ]
Ω ∈
) , , ( ω i i t a
− − × , [ ξ ε
) , , ( ω i i t a
i t 0 ( i ,t a
A  simple lottery is denoted by α , which has the countable support 
 where  . Let ∆ denote the set of all simple lotteries. We assume the 
expected utility hypothesis, where the expected utility for agent i when the central planner 
chooses a pure alternative according to α  and fines agent i the amount   at the state 
 is denoted by u . 
] 1 , 0 [ : → A
∆ ∈
i a t a ) ( ) , , α ω
















A social choice function is defined as a mapping from states to simple lotteries and is 
denoted by  , where   is regarded as the socially desired simple lottery 
at the state ω . We denote by   the set of all social choice functions. 
∆ → Ω : f
Ω ∈
∆ ∈ ) (ω f
F
A pair of distinct states ω  and ωΩ  is said to be preference-equivalent if 
these states induce the same preference profile, i.e., if for every i , there exist β  
and γ  such that 
Ω ∈ } /{ω ∈ ′
N ∈ 0 > i
R i ∈
i i i i i i t a u t a u γ ω β ω+ = ′ ) , , ( ) , , (  for all a  and all t .  A ∈ ] 0 , [ ξ ε− − ∈ i
A social choice function    is said to be normative if there exists a preference-
equivalent pair of states ω  and ωΩ  such that 
F f ∈
Ω ∈ } /{ω ∈ ′
) ( ) ( ω ω ′ ≠ f f . 
Here, different simple lotteries may be socially desired even if the agents have the same 
preference profile. 
A mechanism is defined by G , where M  is the set of messages for each 
agent  ,  ,  ,  , and x . When the 
agents announce the message profile m , the central planner chooses a pure alternative 
) , , ( x g M =







i M M M g : N i∈ ) ] 0 , [ : ξ ε− − → M i
                                                 
10  There may exist other individuals who are relevant to the central planner’s decision but do not 
participate in the decision procedure.   7 
according to the simple lottery g   and fines each agent i  the  amount 
. 
∆ ∈ ) (m
i i M ∈ ′







) ( = m g
] , 0 [ ) ( ξ ε+ ∈ − m xi
) , ( ω G
( i g u
(m g
G
) ( ) ( ω ω ′ ≠ f f
f
( ) (ω ≠ f f
A message profile m  is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game defined by 
 if for every i , and every m , 
M ∈
N ∈
) ), / ( ), ) ), ( ), ( ω ω i i i m m x m x m ′ ≥ . 
A social choice function   is said to be implemented by a mechanism G  in Nash 
equilibrium if at every state ω , there exists a Nash equilibrium m  in ( , and 






) ω , G
m
) ( ) ω f = . 
 
Proposition 1: For every normative social choice function  , there exists no mechanism 




Proof: Let a pair of states ω  and ωΩ  be preference-equivalent and satisfy that 
. Whenever a message profile m  is a Nash equilibrium in ( , then it is 
also a Nash equilibrium in ( . Hence, both g  and   must 
hold if   is implemented by G  in Nash equilibrium. This, however, is a contradiction 









In the same way as in Proposition 1, it follows that no normative social choice function 
is implementable in any purely self-interested solution concept in the complete information 
environments such as dominant strategies, iterative dominance, undominated Nash 
equilibrium, perfect Nash equilibrium, and strict Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it follows 
that no normative social choice function is virtually implementable in any purely self-
interested solution concept in the complete information environments, because any other 
social choice function that is sufficiently close to the normative social choice function must 
be normative. In Section 5, we will show that even in the incomplete information 
environments, a similar impossibility result may hold. 
   8 
3. Complete Information with Small Fines 
 
This section considers the complete information environments where all agents know what is 
the true state. We assume that only three agents are required to announce messages, i.e., 




We allow the central planner to fine agents positive amounts of the private goods, i.e.,  
    and  > ε 0 > ξ , 
both of which may be close to zero. 
We consider only a class of mechanisms   satisfying that for every i ,  ) , , (
* x g M G = N ∈
i K
i M Ω = , 
where   is a positive integer. Each agent i  announces   elements of Ω at one time as 
her multiple opinions about the state. For every i , let M  and 
, where M  and  . The honest message for each agent i at 































M ∈ = 1 )
ω ω µ = ) ( i  for all  .  } ,..., 1 { i K k∈
Let   denote an honest message profile. We further confine our attention to 
mechanisms satisfying that there exists a positive integer   such that 
N i i ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω µ ω µ
K
1 1 + = K K  and  .  K K K = = 3 2
Agent 1 announces K  elements  of  , whereas each of agents 2 and 3 announces K  
elements of Ω. For every k , let m  denote the profile of the k  
opinions. 
1 + Ω
} ,..., 1 { K ∈ ) ,..., ( 1
k
n
k k m m = th −
 
3.1. Iterative Honesty-Proofness 
 
This section assumes that only agent 1 is honesty-oriented in a lexicographical sense that she 
prefers   to   if m  is the same as m  except for the (  opinion, both   and   
provide her with the same expected utility, and m   induces agent 1 to make the honest 
announcement as her (  opinion,  i.e.,  . Hence, agent 1 is 
required to be honesty-oriented only for her (  announcement. 




K m ω µ
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We introduce the solution concept named iterative honesty-proofness as follows. Let 
  denote the set of all messages m   for agent 1 satisfying that either 
, or 
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11 This implies that all other individuals have single-valued sets of messages. We do not require all other 
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M ∈ ) (ω µ
. This first round of iterative removal implies that agent 1 is honesty-oriented in the 
sense that for every m , whenever m  and m  always provides her with at 
least the same expected utility as m  irrespective of the other agents’ messages, then she never 
announces  . For every i , let M . For every integer h , let 
, and let M  for all  . For every h , 
and every i , let   denote the set of all messages   for agent   satisfying that 
, and there exists no m  such that 
M ∈
) ,ω
, ( ω h Mi
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( ) , , ( ω ω ω f z = ′ =
Ω ∈ ′ ω
) ω ) ( ω ω z , ,ω′ ) ,ω ω = ′
α ≠ ω ω = ′ ′ ′ ) , ω, ( z ω ω ω ≠ ′ ′ ≠ ′ ω
    for all  .  ( ∈ h i
Hence, in every round of iterative removal except the first round, we require only that each agent 
is purely self-interested in the sense that she never announces strictly dominated messages. Let 
 and  . 
A message profile   is said to be iteratively honesty-proof in the game   if  ) ( ω G
. 
Note that the definition of iterative honesty-proofness is irrelevant to the order of iterative 
removal, provided that agent 1 is honesty-oriented not only in the first round but also in the other 
rounds. Note also that if there exists the unique iteratively honesty-proof message profile   
in  , then it is the unique Nash equilibrium in (  satisfying that agent 1 behaves as 
being honesty-oriented in the sense that either  , or 
   , 
where  . A social choice function   is said to be implemented by the 
mechanism G  in iterative honesty-proofness if for every  , the honest message profile 





3.2. Specification of Mechanisms 
 
We specify a mechanism G  as follows. Fix a lottery  ∆  arbitrarily. We 
define   in ways that for every  , and every  , 
, 
and for every  , 
 if  . 
We may regard z as the majority rule in the sense that to every triplicate of opinions, it assigns 










) (  for all  .  M m∈
For every k , with probability  } ,..., 1 { K ∈
K
1
, the central planner chooses a pure alternative 
according to  .  ∆ ∈ ) (
k m z
For every i , and every m , we denote by k   the number of 
integers   satisfying that there exists   such that   is the k-th majority opinion 
that is announced by the other agents than agent 1, i.e., m  for all  , and agent i 
does not announce this opinion, i.e., m . Hence, each agent i  announces   
opinions that are different from their respective majority opinions when m  is announced. 
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M ∈
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ξ ) , (
) ( − =  otherwise. 
Each of agent 2 and agent 3 is fined the amount   if and only if she is the first to announce a 
different opinion from agent 1’s (K+1)-th opinion. For every k , each agent is fined 
the amount 
ε
} ,..., 1 { K ∈
K
ξ
 if and only if there exists the k-th majority opinion and she does not announce it. 
Our construction is similar to Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1994) in that each agent 
announces multiple opinions about the state, and the central planner fines the first deviants. Our 
construction, however, is much simpler than Abreu and Matsushima, because we do not use the 
device of virtualness originated in Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991).
12 
When all agents announce the honest message profile  , the central planner chooses a 
pure alternative according to the lottery   that is assigned by the social choice function   to 
the true state   and no agents are fined, i.e., for every  , 
) (ω µ
Ω ∈ ω
) (ω f f
Ω ∈ ω
) ( )) ( ( ω ω µ f g =  and  .  0 )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( 3 2 1 = = = ω µ ω µ ω µ x x x
                                                 
12 Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) did not assume that each agents can be fined a small amount of the 
private goods, and instead did assume a weaker restriction that the central planner can fine each agent by 
changing an allocation to another one satisfying that she prefers the former to the latter. Abreu and 
Matsushima (1994) assumed that utilities are quasi-linear, whereas the present paper does not assume the 
quasi-lineality except Sections 5 and 6.   11 
 
3.3. The Possibility Theorem 
 
Note that for every  , and every  , the message profile   is a Nash 




} /{ω ω Ω ∈ ′ ) (ω µ ′
i i M ∈ ) ),ω K N i∈ m
) ), / ) ( ( ), ( ( ) ), / ) ( ( ), / ) ( ( ( ω ω µ ω ω ω µ ω µ i i i i i i i m x f u m x m g u ′ ′ = ′ ′  
) )), ( ( )), ( ( ( ) , 0 ), ( ( ω ω µ ω µ ω ω ′ ′ = ′ ≤ i i i x g u f u . 
This implies that every inconstant social choice function   is never implemented by the 
mechanism G  in Nash equilibrium, irrespective of  . In contrast, the following theorem 
states that whenever   is chosen sufficiently large then every social choice function   can 
be implemented by G  in iterative honesty-proofness. 
F f ∈





) ,K f (
 
Theorem 2: For every social choice function  , there exists   such that   is implemented 
by   in iterative honesty-proofness. 
F f ∈ K f
) , (
* K f G
 
Proof: Since   and   are compact, there exist positive real numbers   and v  such 
that for every  , and every  , 
A
i∈
Ω 0 > ρ 0 >
N Ω × − − × ∈ ] 0 , [ ) , , ( ξ ε ω A t a i
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K > . 
Fix    arbitrarily. Agent 1 has incentive to announce m  in  the  game 
, because both g  and   are independent of  . Fix k  and 
 arbitrarily, and suppose that 
Ω ∈ ω
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Fix i  arbitrarily, and suppose  . Let   be the message for agent i 
defined by 
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i m  12 
0 ) ( ) / ( > ≥ − ′
K
m x m m x i i i
ξ
, 
which implies that agent i has incentive to announce   instead of  . If   for some 
, then 







m x m m x i i i
ξ
ε + = − ′ ) ( ) / (,  
and therefore, agent i has incentive to announce m  instead of  , because  i′ i m
) ), / ( ), / ( ( ) ), ( ), ( ( ω ω i i i i i i m m t m m g u m t m g u ′ ′ −  
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which are derived from the inequalities (1), (2), and (3).
13 
Next, suppose i , and m  for all  . Then, agent 1 has incentive to 
announce   instead of  , because   is independent of  , and 






} 1 /{ N j∈
1 m′ 1 m
k m1
0 ) ( ) / ( 1 1 1 > = − ′
K
m x m m x
ξ
. 
From the above arguments, we have proved that   is the unique iteratively honesty-proof 






Theorem 2 implies that every normative social choice function is implementable in iterative 
honesty-proofness. This is in contrast to the fact that any normative social choice function is never 
implementable in any purely self-interested solution concept such as Nash equilibrium. 
Whether and whom the central planner will fine crucially depends on agent 1’s (  
opinion. Note that only the agent who tells a lie will be fined if and only if agent 1’s 
opinion is honest. This implies that all agents will announce the honest message profile as the 
unique equilibrium even when agent 1 is not necessarily honesty-oriented but does dislike 
harming truth-telling agents. 
th K − + ) 1
th K − + ) 1 ( 
 
                                                 
13 We must note that   is never eliminated before   being eliminated.  i m′ i m  13 
4. Complete Information with No Fines 
 
This section reconsiders the complete information environments and assumes  . In 
contrast to Section 3, we do not allow the central planner to fine agents, i.e., we assume 
 and 
3 = n
0 = ε 0 = ξ . Hence, we consider only mechanisms satisfying that 
0 ) ( = m xi  for  all i  and  all  .  N ∈ M m∈
We will simply write   instead of u . We further confine our attention to 
mechanisms    where for every  , 
) , ( ω a ui
) ,x g
) , 0 , ( ω a i
N i∈ , (
~
M G =
} 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 { × Ω = i M . 
Hence, each agent announces an integer in the set   as well as a single element of 
. For every i , let   and   where  , 
, and m . Let   and   for 
each  . The honest message rule for each agent    at each state   is  defined 
by 
} 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 {
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Hence, by announcing the honest message, each agent announces the integer 0 as her 
second opinion. Let  ,  , and  .  N i i ∈ = )) ( ~ ( ) ( ~ ω µ ω µ N i i ∈ = )) ( ~ ( ) ( ~ 1 1 ω µ ω µ N i i ∈ = )) ( ~ ( ) ( ~ 2 2 ω µ ω µ
 
4.1. Honesty-Proof Nash Equilibrium 
 
This section assumes that agent 1 is honesty-oriented in a lexicographical sense that she 
prefers   to   if m  is the same as   except for her first opinion, both   and 
  provide her with the same expected utility, and    induces agent 1 to make the honest 
announcement as her first opinion, i.e., 
1 m 1 m′ 1 1 m′ 1 m






1 ) ( ~ m m ′ ≠ = ω µ . 
A Nash equilibrium message profile    in the game    is said to be 
honesty-proof if either  , or 






1 ω µ = m
) ), / ( ( ) ), ( ( 1 1 1 ω ω m m g u m g u ′ >
~
, 
where  . Hence, if   is a honesty-proof Nash equilibrium, then either 
agent 1 makes the honest announcement as her first opinion or the replacement of her first 
opinion by the honest announcement    is not a best reply. 




1 1 m m ω µ = ′ m




1 m ω µ =
A social choice function   is said to be implemented by the mechanism   in 
honesty-proof Nash equilibrium if for every  , the honest message profile   is 
the unique honesty-proof Nash equilibrium at the state   in  , and 
F f ∈ G ~
) ω Ω ∈ ω ( ~ µ
ω G
~
) ( )) ( ~ ( ω ω µ f g = . 
   14 
4.2. Specification of Mechanisms 
 
For every  , we define agent   dictatorial social choice function 
by 
N i∈ s i′ A di → Ω : 
) , ( ) ), ( ( ω ω ω a u d u i i i ≥  for  all   and  all  .  Ω ∈ ω A a∈
At every state  , agent   prefers d  the best. We introduce the following two 
conditions on   
Ω ∈ ω
N i i d ∈ ) (.
i ) (ω i
 
Condition 1: For every  ,  , every  , and every  ,  Ω ∈ ω Ω ∈ ′ ω N i∈ N j∈
  u  if  .  )
)
                                                
), ( ( ) ), ( ( ω ω ω ω ′ > j i i i d u d ) ( ) ( ω ω ′ ≠ j i d d
 
The inequalities in Condition 1 imply that agent    strictly prefers her dictatorial choice 
  to any element in the range of agent    dictatorial social choice function. 
i
) (ω i d s j'
 
Condition 2: For every  , and every  , there exists   such  that  Ω ∈ ω N i∈ } /{i N j∈
  d .  ( ) ( ω ω i j d ≠
 
We specify a modulo mechanism   as follows. ) (
~ ~
f G G =
{− ∈ l
14 We define   in 
ways that for every  , there exists   such  that 
N M →
2 : ι







1 m l m m m ι + = + + . 
The function    defines the ‘modulo game’ where each agent    announces an integer 
  in the set   and  agent    will be the winner. We specify    in ways that 
for every  , 
ι N i∈
2
i m } 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 {
M
) (
2 m ι g
m∈
) ( ) (
1
i i m d m g =
~
 if i   and there exists no   such  that  ) (
2 m ι = Ω ∈ ω
) (ω µi j m =   for two or more agents  ,  N j∈
and for every  ,  Ω ∈ ω
) ( ) ( ω f m g =  if    for two or more agents  .  ) ( ~ ω µi i m = N i∈
The central planner chooses a pure alternative according to the simple lottery that the social 
choice function assigns to the majority opinion when it exists. When there exists no 
majority opinion, the winner    of the modulo game becomes dictatorial.  i
When all agents announce the honest message profile  , the central planner 
chooses a pure alternative according to the simple lottery   that is assigned by the 
social choice function    to the state  , i.e., for every  , 




ω f Ω ∈ ω
) ( )) ( ~ ( ω ω µ f g = . 
 
14  See Maskin (1999) and Moore (1992). In a modulo mechanism, each agent announces an integer 
in a finite set as well as makes a single announcement about the state, and whenever agents make 
inconsistent announcements then they play the modulo game.   15 
 
4.3. The Possibility Theorem 
 
Note that for every  , and every  , the message profile   is a 
Nash equilibrium in  , because for every  , and every  , 
Ω ∈ ω
) ),ω f
} /{ω ω Ω ∈ ′
N i∈
) ( ~ ω µ ′
(
~
(G i i M m ∈
) ), ( ( ) ), / ) ( ( ( ω ω ω ω µ ′ = ′ f u m g u i i i . 
This implies that every inconstant social choice function   is never implemented by 
 in Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the following theorem states that with minor 
restrictions, every social choice function   can be implemented by G  in 
honesty-proof Nash equilibrium. We introduce the following condition on the social choice 










Condition 3: For every  , and every  ,  Ω ∈ ω } /{ω ω Ω ∈ ′
) ), ( ( ) ), ( ( ω ω ω ω ′ > f u d u i i i   for two or more agents  .  N i∈
 
Condition 3 implies that there exists no lottery in the range of the social choice function 
that is best preferred by two or more agents. 
 
Theorem 3: With Conditions 1 and 2, a social choice function   is implemented by 






Proof: Fix    arbitrarily. Note that for every  ,  Ω ∈ ω
~
N i∈
) ( ) / ) ( ( ω ω µ f m g i =  for  all m .  i i M ∈
Hence,    is an honesty-proof Nash equilibrium.  ) ( ~ ω µ
Fix  , and suppose that   is an honesty-proof Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose that   for some  . Then, agent 1 has incentive to announce 
, because   for  all m . This is a contradiction. 
)} ( /{ ω µ M m∈
) ( ~ ω µ ′ = m
( ~ ( ω µ ′ g
m
} ω /{ ω Ω ∈ ′
) ω′ ) ( ~
1 ω µ ( ) / 1 = f m ) 1 1 M ∈
Suppose that there exist   and   such  that  , and   
for all  . Then, it follows that 
Ω ∈ ′ ω N i∈ ) ( ~ ω µ ′ ≠ i i m ) ( ~ ω µ ′ = j j m
} /{i N j∈
) ( ) ( ω′ = i f m g . 
From Condition 3, it follows that there exists   such  that  } /{ ~ i N i ∈
  u .  ) ), ( ( ) ), ( ( ~ ~ ~ ω ω ω ω ′ > f u d i i i
Note that there exists   such  that  } /{ ~ ~ ~ i i i m M m ∈ ′
2 ω = ′
1
~ i m ,  ,  ,  } 3 , 2 , 1 { ~ ∈ ′
i m ) / ( ~ 2
~
2
i m m i ′ =ι
and therefore, 
) ( ) / ( ~ ~ ω i i d m m g = ′ .   16 
Hence, agent    has incentive to announce   instead  of  . This is a contradiction.  i ~
i m~ ′
i m~
Suppose that there exists no   such that   for two or more 
agents  . Then, it follows that 
} /{ω ω Ω ∈ ′ ) ( ~ ω µ ′ = i i m
N i∈
   .  ) ( ) (
1
) ( ) (
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ι ι =
From Condition 1, it follows that if  , then agent   has 
incentive to announce   instead of  , where  ,  , 
, and therefore, 
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From Condition 2, it follows that if d , then there exists 
 who has incentive to announce m  instead of  , where  , 
,  , and therefore, 
) ( ) (
) (
1
) ( ) (
2 2 2 ω
ι ι ι m m m d m =
j ′ ))} ( /{
2 m N j ι ∈
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2 ∈ ′ j m ( ι
j m ω = ′
1
j m
j m m j = ′ ) /
2 2
) ( ) / ( ω j j d m m g = ′ , 
which is preferred to   by  agent  . This is a contradiction.  ) ( ) (
) (
2 ω
ι m d m g = j
From the above arguments, we have proved that   is the unique honesty-proof 
Nash equilibrium. 
) ( ~ ω µ
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 3 implies that every normative social choice function is implementable in 
honesty-proof Nash equilibrium, where we use no fines. We must note that there may exist 
unwanted mixed strategy equilibria that may be consistent with the honesty-proofness. For 
example, consider a mixed message profile, according to which, for every  , each 
agent   announces   with  probability 
} 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ k
N i∈ ) , ( k ω
3
1
. The resultant lottery equals 
3
) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 ω ω ω d d d + +
, 
which may be different from the socially desired simple lottery   at the state  . 
Note that this mixed message profile is a Nash equilibrium at the state  . When each 






) N i∈ k
3
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which is not preferred to 
3
) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 ω ω ω d d d + +
 by this agent. This mixed action profile 
is consistent with the honesty-proofness constraints, because it does induce every agent to 
announce the true state as her first opinion. Hence, it follows that when we take mixed 
strategy equilibria into account, the modulo mechanism may not be able to implement a   17 
social choice function even if we require the honesty-proofness in the above sense. 
A possible way of solving this difficulty would be the following. Suppose that the 
integer 0 is regarded as being ‘salient’, and agent 1 is not only honesty-oriented but also 
salience-oriented in that at any state  , she surely announces the honest message 
 whenever it is one of her best replies. Then, it follows that whenever all 
other agents play the mixed message profile above then agent 1 has incentive to announce 
the honest message   instead of the mixed message, because the resultant lottery 
equals 
Ω ∈ ω
) 0 , ( ) ( ~




) ( 2 ω d ( ) 3 ω d + ) ( 1 ω d +
, i.e., the honest message is one of her best replies. Hence, it 
follows that we can eliminate the mixed message profile when agent 1 is salience-oriented 
as well as honesty-oriented. 
   18 
5. Incomplete Information: Lexicographical Approach 
 
This section considers the incomplete information environments. Each agent i  
knows only her private signal ω , where Ω  is the nonempty and finite set of private 
signals. The set of states is defined as the Cartesian product of the sets of private signals, 
i.e.,  .
N ∈






: ) | → Ω−i i ω
} /{i N
15  The private signal structure is given by p  w h e r e  
 is the conditional probability function. For every i , and every 
, let 
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We assume that three or more agents are required to announce messages, i.e., 
  n .  3
0
                                                
≥
We assume that the central planner is allowed to fine agents where 
    and  ξ . > ε 0 =
16 
We also assume that utilities are quasi-linear in that for every i , and every 
, 
N ∈
i i A t a Ω × − × ∈ ] 0 , [ ) , , ( ε ω
i i i i t a u t a u + = ) , ( ) , , ( ω ω . 
We consider only mechanisms G  satisfying that for every  ,  ) , , ( ˆ x g M = N i∈
i K
i i M Ω = . 
Each agent i  announces   elements of Ω  at one time as her multiple opinions about 
her private signal. Let M  and  , where M  and 
. A message rule for each agent i  is defined by a function η . Let 
 denote the set of all message rules for agent i. We denote by η  a message rule 
profile. Let 
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N i∈ i) (η
 
15 In the next section, we reconsider the incomplete information environments, where we do not 
assume the finiteness. 
16 This section requires a stronger version of honesty-proofness than the previous section in that 
every agent is honesty-oriented for all of her multiple announcements. This makes the fine ξ  
redundant, because even without this fine every agent may have incentive to make all of her 
announcements honest. On the other hand, when an agent is honesty-oriented only for her partial 
announcements, we may need a positive fine ξ  in order for her to have strict incentive to make 
all of her announcements honest. 
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i ω ω η= ) ( ˆ  for all   and all ω .  } ,..., 1 { i K k∈ i i Ω ∈
Let η  denote the honest message rule profile.  N i i ∈ = ) ˆ ( ˆ η
A mixed message for each agent i  is defined by a function  , where 
. A mixed message rule for each agent    is defined by a function 
. A mixed message rule profile χ  is said to be a mixed Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium in a mechanism G  if for every i , every ω , 
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where  ,  , and E  implies 
the expected value conditional on ω . A social choice function    is said to be 
implemented by a mechanism G   in mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there exists a 
mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium in G , and every mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium   in 
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All agents are said to have complete knowledge about their preferences if a pair of 
distinct states ω  and ωΩ   is preference-equivalent whenever there exists at 
least one agent i  such that ω . We can show that with complete knowledge and 
with a minor restriction on the class of mechanisms, no normative social choice function is 
implementable in mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A mechanism G  is said to be regular 
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where   and  . Regularity requires that at every state 
, there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium in the game with complete information 
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17 Regularity is a condition regarding the plausibility of mechanisms, which is similar to, but not the 
same as, the regularity addressed in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b).   20 
Proposition 4: Suppose that all agents have complete knowledge about their preferences. 
Then, for every normative social choice function  , there exists no regular mechanism G  




Proof: Since each agent i  has complete knowledge about her preference, it follows 
that without loss of generality, we can write u  instead  of    in this proof. 
Suppose that a regular mechanism G   implements a social choice function   in  mixed 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For every ω , let 
N ∈
, (G
) , ( i i ω ⋅
ω
) , ( ω ⋅ i u
f
Ω ∈ λ   be a mixed Nash equilibrium 
message profile in the game  , satisfying that for every i ,  ) ω N ∈
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ω  for all m .  i i M ∈ ′
Without loss of generality, we assume that whenever ω  and ω  are preference-equivalent 
then  . Since all agents have complete knowledge about their preferences, it follows 
that there exists a mixed message rule profile   such that 
′
ω ω λ λ
′ =
N i∈ i = ) (χ χ
    for all ω , 
ω λ ω χ= ) ( Ω ∈
and it is a mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium in G . Note that whenever ω  and ω  are 
preference-equivalent then   and   are the same. This is a contradiction when   
is a normative social choice function. 
′
) (ω χ ) (ω χ ′ f
Q.E.D. 
 
In the same way as in Proposition 4, it follows that no normative social choice function 
is implementable in any purely self-interested solution concept in the incomplete 
information environments with complete knowledge and regularity. Moreover, it follows 
that no normative social choice function is virtually implementable in any purely self-
interested solution concept in the incomplete information environments with complete 
knowledge and regularity, because any other social choice function that is sufficiently close 
to the normative social choice function must be normative. 
A social choice functions   is said to be incentive compatible if for every i , and 
every ω , 
f N ∈
i i Ω ∈
] | ) ), / ( ( [ ] | ) ), ( ( [ i i i i i f u E f u E ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ′ ≥  for all ω .  i i Ω ∈ ′
In other word, a social choice functions is incentive compatible if and only if the honest 
message rule profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the direct mechanism associated 
with this social choice function and with zero side payments. 
 
5.1. Bayesian Iterative Honesty-Proofness 
 
A message m  for  agent    is said to be more honest than a message 
 when her private signal is given by ω , if for every k , 
i i M ∈ N i∈
} /{ i i i m M m ∈ ′ i i Ω ∈ } ,..., 1 { i K ∈  21 
i
k
i m ω = ′  whenever  ,  i
k
i m ω =
and 
either   or   whenever m .  i
k




i m m = ′ i
k
i ω ≠
We assume that every agent is honesty-oriented in a lexicographical sense that she prefers 
 to   if   is more honest than m  and both   and   provide her with the same 
expected utility. Hence, every agent is required to be honesty-oriented for all of her   
announcements. This is in contrast to Section 3 where only agent 1 is required to be 
honesty-oriented and she is so only for the (   announcement. We denote by 
 the set of all messages   for agent   that are more honest than 
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We introduce the solution concept named Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness as 
follows. For every i , let Ξ . For every integer h , and every i , let 
 denote the set of all message rules η  for agent i  satisfying that there 
exist no η  and no ω  such that 
N ∈
) 1
i i Ξ ≡ ) 1 (
i i Ω ∈
2 ≥ N ∈
) (h i Ξ ) 1 ( − Ξ ∈ h i i
( − Ξ ∈ ′ h i i
)) ( , ( ) ( i i i i i i M ω η ω ω η∈ ′ , 
and for every η ,  ) 1 ( − Ξ ∈ − − h i i
] | )) ( / ) ( ( ) )), ( / ) ( ( ( [ i i i i i i i x g u E ω ω η ω η ω ω η ω η ′ + ′  
] | )) ( ( ) )), ( ( ( [ i i i x g u E ω ω η ω ω η+ ≥ , 
where   and  . Hence, each agent never 
announces dominated messages with respect to the honesty-proofness in every round of 
iterative removal. Let Ξ  and  . A message rule profile 
 is said to be Bayesian iteratively honesty-proof in the mechanism G  if η . 
Note that the definition of Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness is irrelevant to the order of 
iterative removal. Note also that if there exists the unique Bayesian iteratively honesty-
proof message rule profile η  in  , then it is the unique mixed Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium   in G  satisfying that every agent i  behaves as being honesty-oriented in 
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A social choice function   is said to be implemented by the mechanism G  in Bayesian 
iterative honesty-proofness if the honest message rule profile η   is the only iteratively 
honesty-proof message rule profile in  , and for every ω , 
f ˆ
ˆ
G ˆ Ω ∈
) ( )) ( ˆ ( ω ω η f g = ,   22 
and 
0 )) ( ˆ ( = ω η i x  for all i .  N ∈
 
5.2. Specification of Mechanisms 
 
We specify a mechanism G  as follows. Let  ) , ( ˆ ˆ K f G =
1 + = K Ki  for all i .  N ∈
For every k , let m , η , and η . 
We specify   by 
} 1 ,..., 1 { + ∈ K
g
) ,..., ( 1
k
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Hence, for every k , with probability  } ,..., 1 { K ∈
K
1
, the central planner chooses a pure 
alternative according to the lottery   that the social choice function   assigns to the 
profile of agents’ k-th opinions  . 
) (
k m f f
k m
For every i , and every  , we define a function s  in 
ways that for every ω , 
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For every i , and every m , we define h  as  the  integer   
satisfying that there exists   such that 
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If no such   exist, let h . For every i , every  , and every 
, we define N  as the set of all agents   satisfying that 
. Note that for every i , and every m ,   is an empty set. 
For every i , we specify   by 
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Our construction is similar to Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) in that each agent makes 
announces multiple opinions about her private signal and the central planner fines the first   23 
deviants. Our construction, however, is simpler than Abreu and Matsushima, because we 
do not use the device of virtualness.
18 
19 
When all agents announce the honest message profile η , the central planner 
chooses a pure alternative according to the lottery   that is assigned by the social 
choice function   to the true state ω  and no agents are fined, i.e., for every ω , 
) ( ˆ ω
) (ω f
f Ω ∈ Ω ∈
) ( )) ( ˆ ( ω ω η f g = , 
and 
0 )) ( ˆ ( = ω η i x  for all i .  N ∈
 
5.3. The Possibility Theorem 
 
We introduce the following condition on the private signal structure  , which requires 
agents’ private signals to be correlated. 
p
 
Condition 4: For every i , every  , every ( , and every 
, 
N ∈ } /{i N j∈ j i j i Ω × Ω ∈ ) ,ω ω
i i Ω ∈ ′ ω
) , | ( ) , | ( j i i j i i p p ω ω ω ω ′ ⋅ ≠ ⋅  if   and  .  0 ) | ( ≠ i j ij p ω ω 0 ) | ( ≠ ′ i j ij p ω ω
 
Condition 4 holds generically in the set of possible private signal structures with 
correlations, but excludes the case that agents’ private signals are independent.
20 The 
following theorem states that with Condition 4, every incentive compatible social choice 
function is implementable in Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness. 
 
Theorem 5: With Condition 4, for every incentive compatible social choice function  , 
there exists K   such that    is implemented by the mechanism G  in  Bayesian 
iterative honesty-proofness. 
f
f ) , ( ˆ K f
 
Proof:  Condition 4 implies that for every i , every  , every 
 satisfying that  , and every ωΩ , 
N ∈ } /{i N j∈
} i ω j i j i Ω × Ω ∈ ) , ( ω ω 0 ) | ( ≠ i j ij p ω ω /{ i ∈ ′
                                                 
18 Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) did not assume quasi-linearity. 
19 The mechanism, however, is complicated in that it depends on the functions (  defined by 
using the fine detail of the private signal structure  . In the next section, we will construct 
mechanisms that are much simpler in this respect. 
) ij s
p
20 We must note that the genericity of the fact that each agent’s private signal is well informative 
when agents’ private signals are correlated crucially depends on what is the class of state spaces that 
we are considering. Neeman (1999) showed that the genericity of this informativeness does not hold 
when agents’ preferences depend not only on their private signals but also on other factors. See, 
however, the next section of the present paper, where we will not require any restriction on the state 
space such as Condition 4.   24 
0 ] , | ) / ( ) ( [ > ′ − j i i ij ij s s E ω ω ω ω ω , 
where   implies the expectation value conditional on ( . Hence, 
we can choose K   so that for every i , every  , every (  
satisfying that  , and every ωΩ , 
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For every i , and every ω , agent i   always has incentive to announce 
, because both g  and    are independent of m . Hence, it 
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which is negative, because   is incentive compatible and the inequalities (4) hold. Hence, 
it follows that η  for all η , and therefore, we have proved that η  is the unique 
Bayesian honesty-proof message rule profile in G .  
f
k k η ˆ = ) (∞ Ξ ∈ ˆ
) , ( ˆ K f
Q.E.D.   26 
6. Incomplete Information: Positive Cost Approach 
 
This section reconsiders the incomplete information environments. We assume that 
utilities are quasi-linear and the central planner is allowed to fine agents, where  ,  0 > ε
0 = ξ , and   may be close to zero. In contrast to Section 5, we assume that it is costly for 
every agent to lie as her   announcement. The cost of lying can be as close to zero as 
possible. Based on this positive cost hypothesis, together with agents’ lexicographical 
preferences on honest reporting, we will introduce a modified version of Bayesian iterative 
honesty-proofness named Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness with positive cost, and 
show that every social choice function is implementable in this solution concept. This result 
is very permissive. We do not require any restriction on the private signal structure such as 
Condition 4. Hence, we allow agents’ private signals to be independent. We do not assume 
that the set of state is finite. We do not assume that the number of agents is three or more, 
i.e., we assume only n . Of particular importance, the constructed mechanism will be 
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6.1. Specification of Mechanisms 
 
We specify a mechanism   as follows. For every  ,  ) , ( ˆ ˆ * * K f G G = N i∈
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where   is a positive real number satisfying  ε ˆ
ε ε ≤ < ˆ 0.  
Note that when all agents announce the honest message profile  ) ( ˆ ω η , the central planner 
chooses a pure alternative according to the lottery   that is assigned by the social 
choice function   to the true state   and no agents are fined, i.e., for every  , 
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and 
0 )) ( ˆ ( = ω η i x  for all i .  N ∈
Choose a positive real number   satisfying that  0 > v
   ) , ( ) , ( ω ω a u a u i i ′ − ≥ v  for all i , all  , all a , and all  ,  N ∈ Ω ∈ ω A ∈ A a ∈ ′  27 
where   is regarded as the upper bound of agents’ utility differences. We specify K  as a 




v 2 ˆ ≥ ε . 
 
6.2. Bayesian Iterative Honesty-Proofness with Positive Cost 
 
We assume that whenever each agent i   announces a message m  whose 
 opinion is dishonest, i.e., m , then she will experience discomfort 
and incur a positive disutility c . Moreover, every agent is honesty-oriented for the 
other opinions than her (  opinion in the lexicographical sense like Section 5. 
Hence, the total cost of lying is at most c irrespective of  . Hence, by letting c close to 














th − ) K +1
K
Based on this, we define the solution concept named Bayesian iterative honesty-
proofness with positive cost c as follows. For every i , let Ξ  denote the set of all 
message rules 
N ∈ ) 1 (
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where  . This first round of iterative removal implies that 
each agent i   is honesty-oriented in the sense that for every m , whenever 
 and    provides her with at least the expected utility induced by m  
minus the cost of lying c, then she never announces m . For every integer h , and every 
, let Ξ  denote the set of all message rules 
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where   and  . Hence, in every round of 
iterative removal except for the first round, each agent is honesty-oriented only in the 
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η  is said to be Bayesian iteratively honesty-proof with positive cost c in the   28 
mechanism  G  if  . Note that the definition of Bayesian iterative honesty-
proofness with positive cost is irrelevant to the order of iterative removal. Note also that if 
there exists the unique Bayesian iteratively honesty-proof message rule profile with 
positive cost c in G , then it is the unique mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium with positive 
cost   in    on the assumption that each agent’s telling a lie as her ( 
announcement incurs a positive cost c . A  social choice function    is said to be 
implemented by the mechanism G  in  Bayesian  iterative  honesty-proofness with 
positive cost   if the honest message rule profile 
) ) (
* ∞ Ξ ∈ η
ˆ
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and 
 for all i . 
 
6.3. The Possibility Theorem 
 
We use only a smaller fine than the cost of lying, i.e., 
(6)   . 
The following theorem states that every incentive compatible social choice function is 
implementable in Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness with positive cost  . 
 
Theorem 6: Every incentive compatible social choice function   is implemented by the 
mechanism G  in Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness with positive cost c. 
f
 
Proof:  For every i , and every  , agent i   always has incentive to announce 
, because   is independent of m  and the inequality (6) implies that 
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, and  h ≠ ˆ η . Note from the inequality (5) and the incentive compatibility 
that 
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where  is the probability conditional on   that the private signal 
profile   satisfies  ,    implies the expected 
value conditional on    and on the fact that p , and similarly, 
 and    are defined. Hence, it follows that 
 for all  , and therefore, we have proved that 
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 is the unique Bayesian 
honesty-proof message rule profile with positive cost   in  .   c , ( ˆ * f G
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 6 implies that whenever the cost of lying c is positive then every incentive 
compatible social choice function is implementable in Bayesian iterative honesty-proofness 
with positive cost c. Note that the specification of the mechanism G  depends 
only on the cost of lying c, the social choice function  , and the upper bound of agents’ 
utility differences v . Hence, given ( , the central planner can construct the 
mechanism without any knowledge about the private signal structure   
In this sense the mechanism is ‘universal’. This point is in contrast to the standard model 
with incomplete information where the constructed mechanisms crucially depend on the 
fine detail of the private signal structure, and therefore, it would be difficult to use in 
practice. 
) , ( ˆ ˆ * * K f G =
i i p p ⋅ = ω )) | (
f
) , , v f c
i i N i Ω ∈ ∈ ω , (.
Moreover, suppose that truth telling is an ex post equilibrium in the revelation game in 
that for every  , and every  ,  N i∈ Ω ∈ ω
  u  for all  .  ) ), / ( ( ) ), ( ( ω ω ω ω ω i i i f u f ′ ≥ i i Ω ∈ ′ ω
Then, it follows that irrespective of the private signal structure   t h e  
honest message rule profile 
i i N i i i p p Ω ∈ ∈ ⋅ = ω ω , )) | ( (,
η ˆ   is always the unique Bayesian iteratively honesty-proof 
message rule profile in the mechanism G . This implies that even agents do not need 
to know what is the correct private signal structure 
) , ( ˆ * K f
i i N i Ω ∈ ∈ ω , )) (. i i p p ⋅ = ω | (
21 
                                                 
21 For characterization of ex-post equilibrium concept, see Chung and Ely (2002) and Bergemann 
and Morris (2002).   30 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper investigated implementation of social choice functions when agents are 
honesty-oriented only in marginal ways. In the complete information environments with 
small fines, it was shown that every social choice function is implementable when there 
exists a single agent who is not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in a 
lexicographical way. Hence, all social choice functions that are important but never 
implementable in the standard implementation model, such as normative social choice 
functions, are implementable without contradicting the purely self-interested motive. This 
result could be extended to the incomplete information environments with quasi-linearity 
and with correlated private signals. Next, we assumed that it is costly for each agent to 
report dishonestly, but this cost can be as small as possible. It was shown that without any 
restriction on the model structure, every incentive compatible social choice function could 
be implemented by the mechanism that is universal in the sense that it does not depend on 
the private signal structure. 
An underlying assumption in this paper is that agents either play a one-shot game or 
behave myopically in a repeated situation. When an agent is forward-looking and the cost 
of lying are sufficiently small, it might be the case that she is willing to manipulate 
information in order to convince the others that she is not honesty-oriented and likes 
harming others whose reports are against her taste. An important question in future 
researches might be when and how we can construct a mechanism in which honest behavior 
is endogenously stabilized in the dynamic process of evolution and learning.
22 This, 
however, is beyond the purpose of the paper. 
 
                                                 
22 There exist recent works on evolution and learning in the implementation problem such as 
Cabrales (1999) and Matsushima (2002), which assumed naïve adaptive dynamics without forward 
looking players. Moreover, Kandori (2002) applied stochastic evolution to psychological games a la 
Rabin (1993).   31 
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